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Although it may appear antiquated in the “post-deregulation” era, the
concept of antitrust immunity for industrial sectors remains a hallmark of U.S.
international aviation law and policy.1 Following the protracted shutdown of
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in the 1980s,2 the Department of
+
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1. See PAUL L. JOSKOW, DEREGULATION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 19–21, 45–46
(2009) (defending industrial deregulation in the face of the 2008 financial crisis). See generally
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1998) (detailing the United States’ recent regulatory
transformation away from creating agencies to regulate individual industries and discussing the
Civil Aeronautics Board’s shutdown).
2. See Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703
(codified in scattered sections of Titles 5, 15, 16, 26, 29, and 49 U.S.C.); see also Paul Stephen
Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics Board—Opening Wide the Floodgates of
Entry, 11 TRANSP. L.J. 91, 93–95 (1979) (surveying the deregulation of the airline industry and
the CAB’s eventual demise).
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Transportation (DOT) assumed the CAB’s authority to approve and immunize
cooperative agreements between U.S. and foreign airlines.3 Beginning in
1992, airlines sought immunity in order to form the first airline
alliances—joint ventures that allow participants to behave like a single, merged
entity and cooperate on business practices such as pricing, routes, branding,
and consumer perquisite programs.4 Since then, many of the world’s leading
airlines have coalesced into three global alliances: oneworld, SkyTeam, and
Star. Each alliance has air transportation networks spanning the globe.5 Under
normal circumstances, these types of activities would be subject to public and
private antitrust actions, likely on the theory that they constitute a restraint of
trade or an attempt to monopolize international air routes.6
Unlike most global industries, airlines remain subject to treaty-based
restrictions that limit their ability to access global capital markets and
consummate cross-border mergers.7 Although the particulars vary, these
treaty-based restrictions are commonly reinforced by domestic legal codes that
make the issuance of operating authority contingent on the “purity” of an
airline’s ownership profile.8 The United States, for example, mandates that
foreign nationals may hold no more than twenty-five percent of an airline’s
voting stock and requires the airline to remain under the “actual control” of
American citizens.9 As such, airlines are effectively barred from acquiring or
establishing foreign subsidiaries that would allow them to create autonomous
global-route networks while availing themselves to the efficiencies of
consolidation.10 To deliver the transnational services that modern consumers
demand, airlines have relied on alliances as a “second-best” alternative within
3. 49 U.S.C. §§ 41308–41309 (2006).
4. See, e.g., Order to Show Cause, The Acquisition of Northwest Airlines by Wings
Holdings, Inc., Docket No. 46371 (Dep’t of Transp. Nov. 16, 1992), 1992 DOT Av. LEXIS 827
[hereinafter Northwest/KLM Order to Show Cause]; see also W. Robert Hand, Comment,
Continental Joins the (all)star Alliance: Antitrust Concerns with Airline Alliances and
Open-Skies Treaties, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 641, 649 (2011) (discussing the Northwest/KLM
alliance as the first of its kind).
5. See, e.g., Brian F. Havel & Gabriel S. Sanchez, Restoring Global Aviation’s
“Cosmopolitan Mentalité”, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 37 (2011) (discussing the three main global
alliances).
6. See EUR. COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE ALLIANCES:
COMPETITIVE ISSUES AND REGULATORY APPROACHES 5–7 (2010); see also Scott Kimpel,
Antitrust Considerations in International Airline Alliances, 63 J. AIR L. & COM. 475, 479–83
(1997) (describing how DOJ authority, under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, relates to airline
alliances).
7. See Brian F. Havel & Gabriel S. Sanchez, The Emerging Lex Aviatica, 42 GEO. J. INT’L
L. 639, 642–53 (2011) (surveying international aviation’s trade environment, including its
attendant ownership and investment restrictions); see also infra notes 75, 86, 225 and
accompanying text.
8. See Havel & Sanchez, supra note 7, at 640–41, 647–48.
9. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 40102(a)(15), 41101(a)(1), 41102(a) (2006).
10. See Hand, supra note 4, at 643–44.
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a suboptimal regulatory order.11 The DOT, in turn, has leveraged the
commercial appeal of the alliance system into expanded foreign market
opportunities for U.S. airlines by requiring the home countries of
immunity-seeking carriers to first enter liberal aviation trade accords known as
“Open Skies” agreements.12 Though “Open Skies-for-Immunity” has never
been an officially pronounced component of U.S. international aviation
policy,13 neither the DOT nor the Department of State (DOS)14 has made
significant attempts to hide their importance in facilitating U.S. aeropolitical
relations.15
The reaction to immunized alliances has been mixed.16 A recent joint report
on transatlantic alliances sponsored by the DOT and its European Union (EU)
counterpart took a generally positive view of the ventures, even though it
called for further study into the alliances’ effects on competition.17 Jeffrey
Shane, a former DOT official who approved the first alliance application,18
continues to defend the DOT’s immunization practices, primarily on policy
grounds.19 At the other end of the spectrum, the Department of Justice’s (DOJ)
Antitrust Division has criticized antitrust immunity grants consistently, arguing
there should be an automatic presumption against them.20 Several consumer
11. See id.
12. See Final Order, Defining “Open Skies,” Docket No. 48130, at 3–6 (Dep’t of Transp.
Aug. 5, 1992), 1992 DOT Av. LEXIS 568 [hereinafter Defining “Open Skies”] (establishing the
DOT’s official definition of “Open Skies”). The Open Skies template requires the removal of
restrictions on routes, fares, and capacity between partners, though it retains the longstanding
international restrictions on foreign ownership and control. Id.
13. See Statement of United States International Air Transportation Policy, 60 Fed. Reg.
21,841, 21,841 (May 3, 1995) (promoting “rel[iance] on the marketplace and unrestricted, fair
competition to determine the variety, quality, and price of air service”).
14. The DOS is the other executive entity charged with conducting aviation negotiations
with foreign partners. See 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (2006).
15. See Joint Application, All Nippon Airways Co., Ltd., Docket No.
DOT-OST-2009-0350, at 6 n.9 (Dep’t of Transp. Dec. 23, 2009) [hereinafter
ANA/Continental/United Application] (highlighting that U.S. aviation agreements with the
Netherlands, Chile, Germany, France, Canada, Italy, and Japan were preconditioned on
“favorable consideration of antitrust immunity applications” from their respective airlines).
16. Compare infra notes 17–19, with infra notes 20–21.
17. See EUR. COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 6, at 24–25.
18. Northwest/KLM Order to Show Cause, supra note 4, at 23.
19. See Warren L. Dean, Jr. & Jeffrey N. Shane, Alliances, Immunity, and the Future of
Aviation, 22 AIR & SPACE LAW. 1, 17 (2010).
20. See J. Bruce McDonald, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Competition in the Air,
Remarks to the IATA Legal Symposium 2007, Istanbul, Turkey, at 7 (Feb. 12, 2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/222159.htm (“DOJ believes there should be a
presumption against immunity.”); see also Comments of the Department of Justice (Public
Version), American Airlines, Inc., Docket No. OST-2008-0252, at 22–29 (Dep’t of Transp. Dec.
21, 2009) (highlighting the DOJ’s latest critiques of a major antitrust immunity application);
William Gillespie & Oliver M. Richard, Antitrust Immunity and International Airline Alliances
20 (DOJ, Antitrust Div., Econ. Analysis Grp., Discussion Paper No. EAG-11-1, 2011), available
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groups, non-alliance airlines, and labor organizations have shared in the DOJ’s
dissent.21 Meanwhile, academic analysis of immunized alliances reveals
nothing approaching consensus.22 Professor Brian Havel and other legal
scholars have been unimpressed with the DOT’s quasi-legal reasoning,
accusing the DOT of “slouching toward regulatory incoherence.”23 Others,
like Hubert Horan, have focused on the DOT’s perceived shoddy economic
analysis of alliance applications and its betrayal of U.S. commitments to a
deregulated aviation market.24 Both lines of critique suggest a conceptual
realignment of DOT immunization deliberations along economic or
jurisprudential lines, but neither approach adequately addresses the
institutional variables in play.25 This Article intends to fill that lacuna.
Engaging the highly technical and jargon-laden economic quibbles over
alliance benefits (or lack thereof) may have some academic purpose, but their
relevance to the concrete debates over the future of the DOT’s immunity
powers is questionable. In lieu of adopting and defending any of the current
arguments, this Article endeavors to circumvent the ideological stalemate by
applying recent scholarly insight and the institutional advantages of executive
agencies over the other branches to highlight their appropriateness in
advancing the larger policy goals of liberalizing the international air-transport
market.26 In other words, antitrust immunity should be recognized as a
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/eag/267513.pdf (“[A]ntitrust immunity is not reasonably
necessary for alliance participants to deliver pricing efficiencies to connecting passengers.”).
21. See, e.g., The Financial State of the Airline Industry and the Implications of
Consolidation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 111th
Cong. 23 (2010) (statement of Charles Leocha, Director of Consumer Travel Alliance); id. at
20–21 (statement of Robert Roach, Jr., General Vice President, International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers) (testifying against airline consolidations through merges and
alliances); see also Answer of Virgin Atlantic Airways, American Airlines, Inc., Docket No.
DOT-OST-2008-0252, at 1–7 (Dep’t of Transp. May 18, 2009) (including Virgin Atlantic’s
objections to the oneworld Alliance immunity application, but noting that it did not oppose
alliances in principle).
22. Compare, e.g., Volodymyr Bilotkach & Kai Hüschelrath, Antitrust Immunity for Airline
Alliances, 7 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 335, 380 (2011) (arguing for a reassessment of antitrust
immunity for alliances based on economic grounds), with Jan K. Brueckner et al., Alliances,
Codesharing, Antitrust Immunity, and International Airfares: Do Previous Patterns Persist?, 7 J.
COMP. L. & ECON. 573, 594–96 (2011) (finding that immunized alliances yield consumer-welfare
benefits while rejecting the DOJ’s antitrust immunity criticisms).
23. BRIAN F. HAVEL, BEYOND OPEN SKIES: A NEW REGIME FOR INTERNATIONAL
AVIATION 297 (2009). Aside from slight reservations concerning some of his conclusions,
Havel’s analysis of alliances and the DOT’s immunity powers is extremely thorough. See id.
198–208, 287–302.
24. See, e.g., Hubert Horan, “Double Marginalization” and the Counter-Revolution Against
Liberal Airline Competition, 37 TRANSP. L.J. 251, 256–57, 259–60 (2010).
25. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
26. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State:
9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613, 1649–50, 1679–81 (2009)
[hereinafter Posner & Vermeule, Crisis Governance] (discussing institutional advantages held by
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legitimate agency prerogative until the policy winds shift.27 From this angle, it
is not imperative that the DOT’s immunization decisions accord with abstract
standards of economic efficiency or satisfy highly conceptualized, legalist
interpretations of the statutory language that undergirds the DOT’s immunity
powers.28 This view may not satisfy antitrust immunity’s more virulent critics,
but their concerns ring hollow in the political realm. The congressional cloud
that briefly hung over the immunization issue in 2009 has passed,29 and the
executive agencies to address crises); see also Adrian Vermeule, Emergency Lawmaking After
9/11 and 7/7, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1157, 1189–90 (2008) (advocating for increased deference
to the executive branch during emergencies); Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative
Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1101, 1105, 1144 (2009) [hereinafter Vermeule, Schmittian
Administrative Law] (arguing that the actions of administrative agencies inevitably must be given
some deference from judicial scrutiny). The main insights of these articles have been distilled
into ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010) [hereinafter POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND]. For
an earlier application of their arguments to national security, see ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN
VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY AND THE COURTS (2007)
[hereinafter POSNER & VERMEULE, TERROR]. Much of the controversy over their work concerns
their reliance on the work of Carl Schmitt, a political theorist and member of the Nazi Party. See
Gene Healy, Hail to the Tyrant, AM. CONSERVATIVE, June 2011, at 38–39 (reviewing POSNER &
VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra); see also Harvey Mansfield, Is the Imperial
Presidency Inevitable?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2011, at 12 (claiming that Posner and Vermeule
neither need nor know the work of Carl Schmitt). Also insightful is Vermeule’s solo work that
focuses on judicial interpretation and institutional arrangements. See ADRIAN VERMEULE,
JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION
(2006) [hereinafter VERMEULE, UNCERTAINTY] (criticizing the application of hard legal rules in
all circumstances of administrative action); see also ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS
OF REASON (2009) [hereinafter VERMEULE, REASON]. Although this author agrees with much of
Posner and Vermeule’s analysis, none of the contentions raised in this Article rely on their strong
claim that “[w]e live in . . . an age after the separation of powers, and the legally constrained
executive is now a historical curiosity.” POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra, at
4.
27. See POSNER & VERMEULE, TERROR, supra note 26, at 5 (arguing for deference to
administrative agencies); see also Posner & Vermeule, Crisis Governance, supra note 26, at 1681
(arguing for a continuation of deference to executive action).
28. See Vermeule, Schmittian Administrative Law, supra note 26, at 1105–06 (explaining
why the application of hard legal standards is not always suitable for administrative agencies).
29. See H.R. 831, 111th Cong. (2009). Although this piece of legislation, which required
antitrust immunity for alliances to sunset after three years from the time it was granted, failed to
take-off on its own, it was eventually attached to several versions of the FAA Reauthorization
Act. Id. § 1(e). Former Congressman James Oberstar, who served as Chairman of the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and was an outspoken critic of the alliance system,
introduced the legislation. See James L. Oberstar, Chairman, Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure,
U.S. House of Representatives, Remarks to the International Aviation Club, Washington, D.C.
(Mar. 23, 2009), available at http://www.iacwashington.org/Resources/Documents/James
OberStar/ACspeechMar09.pdf. Current Transportation Chairman John Mica led Congress in
striking the antitrust immunity reform provisions from the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2011. See
Press Release, Transp. & Infrastructure Comm., House Transportation Leaders Introduce FAA
Bill (Feb. 11, 2011), available at http://transportation.house.gov/News/PRArticle
.aspx?NewsID=1085.
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American public, which has paid aviation policy little notice since deregulation
in the 1970s, has more pressing concerns in the wake of a debilitating
depression.30 Immunized airline alliances were born out of the sector’s
deficient trade framework; thus, those seeking an international aviation market
predicated on pure free-market principles should redirect their reform efforts to
the elimination of investment restrictions at the domestic and international
levels.31
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I surveys the DOT’s international
aviation trade policy and immunization authority while highlighting the DOT’s
institutional advantages over Congress in these areas. Part II provides further
details on airline alliances, their need for antitrust immunity, and the DOT’s
statutory authority for granting such immunity. Part III examines two lines of
criticism against the DOT’s immunization powers and illuminates their
shortcomings on institutional grounds.
Keeping with institutional
considerations, Part IV exposes a select number of antitrust immunity reform
proposals as normatively unattractive. Part V concludes by looking beyond the
need for immunity in a hypothetical globalized aviation marketplace.
I. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
A. Institutional Make-up and Advantages
The DOT, established in 1967, is dedicated to “ensuring a fast, safe,
efficient, accessible[,] and convenient transportation system that
meets . . . vital national interests and enhances the quality of life of the
American people.”32 This entails monitoring and regulating the nation’s
transportation infrastructure, including road, rail, maritime, and aviation
networks through subject-specific offices.33 The DOT’s Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs is responsible for external
economic regulation,34 such as providing operating licenses,35 promulgating
consumer-protection rules,36 and granting access rights to foreign air
30. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009) (characterizing the 2008 economic downturn as a
depression and explaining its causes and effects).
31. See, e.g., Hand, supra note 4, at 644–45 (arguing that easing cross-border investments
restrictions would eliminate the need for antitrust immunity).
32. About DOT: What We Do, DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.dot.gov/about (last updated
Mar. 27, 2012).
33. Our Agencies, DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.dot.gov/administrations (last updated
Sept. 29, 2012). The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), one of these specific offices,
regulates aviation safety. See 49 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
34. See Asst. Secretary of Aviation & International Affairs, DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
http://www.dot.gov/policy/assistant-secretary-aviation-international-affairs (last updated Sept. 18,
2012).
35. 49 U.S.C. §§ 41101–41103 (2006).
36. 49 U.S.C. § 41712 (2006 & Supp. 2011).
THE
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carriers.37 Unlike the DOT’s predecessor, CAB, the DOT does not regulate
airline rates, routes, and services comprehensively, nor is the DOT supposed to
erect high barriers to entry in order to protect incumbents.38 Further, the DOT
lacks the CAB’s antitrust authority over the domestic air-transport market, but
it retains the power to immunize international inter-carrier arrangements,
including airline alliance agreements.39
As an executive agency, the DOT operates within the orbit of the President’s
policy preferences.40 As such, the DOT can reasonably be expected to respond
to shifts in the political winds.41 The DOT shares in the general institutional
advantages that accrue to agencies by congressional consent. Namely, the
DOT can set policy goals, issue rules and rulings, collect information, and
interface with other agencies—executive or independent—to fulfill these
various ends.42 The legislative branch regulates the general contours of the
DOT’s powers, but the DOT has been delegated enough authority to move
with the requisite speed and knowledge to handle fluctuating aviation-related
matters.43 The debatable “cost” of this flexibility is that the DOT, like the
executive branch as a whole, may be subject to few express legal constraints,
but political monitoring can occasionally constrain agency behavior.44 Even if

37. 49 U.S.C. § 41301–41304 (2006).
38. Compare Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.), with Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703 (codified in scattered sections of Titles 5, 15, 16, 26, 29, and 49
U.S.C.). See also Daniel Petroski, Airlines Response to the DTPA Section 1305 Preemption, 56 J.
AIR L. & COM. 125, 125–30 (1990) (explaining the history of the CAB).
39. See Petroski, supra note 38, at 125–30; see also supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
40. See POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra note 26, at 57 (noting that
“recent empirical work suggests that the heads of independent agencies and executive agencies
tend to have common preferences and beliefs, both aligned with those of the reigning president”).
41. See id.
42. Admittedly, sometimes this “interfacing” hits bumps in the road, particularly where
institutional competence is disputed. See Stephen Labaton, Cracking Down, Antitrust Chief Hits
Resistance, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2009, at A1 (discussing the behind-the-scenes conflict between
the DOJ and DOT over antitrust immunity for airline alliances).
43. Perhaps the most dramatic example of agency action in recent memory was the FAA’s
unilateral decision to ground more than 4,000 flights within hours of the attacks on Sept. 11,
2001. See Alan Levin et al., Part I: Terror Attacks Brought Drastic Decision: Clear the Skies,
USA TODAY, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2002-08-11-clearskies_x.htm (last
visited Oct. 4, 2012).
44. Examples of political monitoring include congressional hearings, newspaper reports,
television exposés, and online forums. See Michael E. Levine, Why Weren’t the Airlines
Regulated?, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 269, 273–74, 277–79, 281, 285, 287–88, 290 (2006) (explaining
the concept of “slack” and the relative regulatory autonomy enjoyed by the DOT, while also
recognizing the impact of “public agenda” issues and the pressure that they can place on DOT
policy).
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the claims of modern executive authority are exaggerated, that does not mean
the DOT lacks a high degree of institutional autonomy.45
Professor Michael Levine, a former CAB attorney, argues that airline
regulatory affairs have rarely been central in public discourse since the
deregulation movement began in the 1970s.46 It is possible that Congress
could, at some point, become more involved, particularly if aviation affairs
once again capture the public’s attention. For instance, the string of
high-profile airline failings induced by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
brought the U.S. government to the brink of re-regulating the airline industry.47
More recently, in 2006, public outcry over a proposal that a United Arab
Emirates-owned company would take control of several U.S. seaports48
spurred Congress to block a DOT attempt to relax U.S. foreign-investment
rules for airlines.49 In both instances, however, congressional involvement
proved fleeting and, with respect to the post-9/11 re-regulation scare,
inconsequential in the long run.50 As such, it appears safer to conceive of

45. See id. at 287 (discussing the political forces that led to less regulation in the airline
industry). Given that much of the DOT’s administrative subject matter involves highly technical
problems related to infrastructural issues that, for the most part, receive scant media attention and
few headlines, its day-to-day regulatory behavior is seldom on the public’s radar. Although some
major industry shake-ups involving bankruptcies, mergers, and security have managed to receive
a fair amount of attention over the years, none of these “attention grabbers” fall directly under
DOT oversight.
46. See Levine, supra note 44, at 277–78, 285–86; see also Webcast: A Conversation with
Michael E. Levine, INT’L AVIATION LAW INST., DEPAUL UNIV. COLL. OF LAW,
http://www.law.depaul.edu/centers_institutes/aviation_law/webcast.asp (last visited Sept. 9,
2012).
47. See Brian F. Havel & Michael G. Whitaker, The Approach of Re-Regulation: The
Airline Industry After September 11, 2001, 20 ISSUES AVIATION L. & POL’Y 4101, 4105–15
(2004) (detailing the effects of the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of
2001).
48. See Deborah M. Mostaghel, Dubai Ports World Under Exon-Florio: A Threat to
National Security or a Tempest in a Seaport?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 583, 606–07 (2007).
49. See Cornelia Woll, Open Skies, Closed Markets: The Importance of Time in the
Negotiation of International Air Transport 20–22 (July 25, 2009) (unpublished paper presented at
the 104th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association held in September
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450441.
50. The 2001 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act expired without
bringing the airlines under strict governmental control. See Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 1974 (repealing much of Title 1 of the Stabilization
Act dealing with aviation). Congress’s assault on the DOT’s investment gambit arguably remains
effective insofar as the DOT has not attempted a similar move since. Conversely, the investment
modification was intended to lure the European Union (EU) into a liberal air transport treaty and
the EU solidified the deal in 2007 anyway, so a strong argument could be made that the
legislative branch’s intervention had no substantive impact on DOT policy. See Woll, supra note
49, at 2.
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congressional constraints on the DOT’s aviation portfolio as subject to
vacillating public interests—a conclusion that is theoretically plausible.51
B. Advantages in International Aviation Policy
Although the DOT’s domestic regulatory power over air transport represents
a decline from the heyday of the CAB, the DOT still wields considerable
control over the external facets of U.S. aviation law and policy.52 Under
federal statute, the DOT—in cooperation with the DOS—is assigned the role
of “develop[ing] a negotiating policy emphasizing the greatest degree of
competition compatible with a well-functioning international air transportation
system.”53 Congress enumerates nine policy points for departments to
consider.54 All of them, however, are stated at a high level of generality and
emanate from prior executive policy commitments.55 For example, the first
point—“strengthening the competitive position of air carriers to ensure at least
equality [of opportunity] with foreign air carriers”—is only accompanied by a
request that U.S. airlines be able to “maintain and increase their profitability in
foreign air transportation.”56 Congress leaves it to the DOS and DOT to craft
the particulars.57 Moreover, the statute does not provide clear guidance on
how much weight should be assigned to each point, nor does it prevent the
DOT from developing additional policy terms broadly consistent with the
statute.58 To the extent that aviation policy must be formed with an eye toward
51. Cf. Levine, supra note 44, at 295–97 (speculating on means to empirically verify the
role public attention has played in U.S. aviation policy)
52. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101(e), 41301 (2006); see also supra notes 12–13.
53. 49 U.S.C. § 40101(e) (2006).
54. Id. § 40101(e)(1)–(9).
55. The statute’s policy points were originally a part of the International Air Transportation
Competition Act of 1979 that, in turn, was born out of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.
Compare International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-192, § 2, 94
Stat. 35, with Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 1705,
1705–07 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). See also Michael T. Pinto, The
International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, 9 DENV. J. INT’L L. 261, 261 (1980).
The deregulation agenda, including its liberalizing terms for domestic and international aviation,
was first developed under the auspices of the CAB and its former Chairman, Alfred Kahn. See
Paul Stephen Dempsey, Turbulence in the “Open Skies”: The Deregulation of International Air
Transport, 15 TRANSP. L.J. 305, 325–27 (1987); see also id. at 329–42 (recounting the CAB and
Carter Administration’s pro-liberalization negotiating framework for international aviation).
56. 49 U.S.C. § 40101(e)(1).
57. Id. § 40101(e).
58. Id. This is unsurprising given that Congress possesses no particular competence over
international aviation policy. Cf. POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra note 26,
at 26 (observing “the relative lack of legislative expertise” and that Congress “lacks the raw
information that [administrative] experts need to make assessments”). Further, Congress does not
have the institutional structures to generate relevant information to the same degree that a
transportation-savvy agency does. The DOT, for instance, has the Bureau of Transportation
Statistics to compile and analyze multimodal transportation data. See About BTS, RES.
& INNOVATION TECH. ADMIN., BUREAU OF TRANSP. STAT., http://www.bts.gov/about/ (last
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international political relations,59 the DOS is well situated to blend its
institutional advantages with those of the DOT to put muscle and flesh on the
aviation policy bones left by Congress.60
Congress’s assignment of negotiating authority to the DOS, in consultation
with the DOT, further confirms this understanding, and it is in line with the
DOT’s articulated policy goals.61 Though Congress vests itself, through the
President, with the ability to send one representative from each house to
observe international aviation negotiations,62 it rarely does.63 History has
shown that Congress is willing to defer to the President’s international trade
policy choices, even with respect to far-reaching trade accords with economic
and social consequences that exceed those of aviation agreements by
significant magnitudes.64 By and large, the development and execution of U.S.
international aviation trade policy remains an executive prerogative carried out
visited Sept. 10, 2012). With respect to international aviation in particular, the DOT has a
dedicated division “[t]o coordinate, develop, and execute international aviation transportation
policy.”
OFF. INT’L AVIATION, DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.dot.gov/policy/aviation
-policy/office-international-aviation (last updated Aug. 30, 2012). Although Congress can rely on
agency-produced information as well as direct agencies to generate particular types of
information, this only shows that the legislative branch may possess an epistemic advantage over
the judiciary, which is far more constrained in terms of informational access. See VERMEULE,
REASON, supra note 26, at 1–9 (introducing arguments for why the legislative branch has an
institutional advantage over the judiciary). Agencies remain on the “front lines” of their assigned
subject matter; Congress appears later.
59. See Statement of United States International Air Transportation Policy, 60 Fed. Reg.
21,841, 21,843–84 (May 3, 1995) (surveying the international relations issues in play).
60. See id. at 21,845–46 (discussing the importance of transnational agreements and
political pressure in effecting favorable agreements).
61. See id. § 40105(c). Although it is true that the DOT and DOS are directed to consult
with aviation stakeholders, such as airports, airlines, and labor, “on broad policy goals and
individual negotiations,” the agencies are only required to do so “to the maximum extent
practicable” or, in other words, at their discretion. Id.
62. See id. § 40105(d).
63. See, e.g., Derek Lick, Note, More Turbulence Ahead: A Bumpy Ride During
U.S.-Japanese Aviation Talks Exemplifies the Need for a Pragmatic Course in Future Aviation
Negotiations, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1207, 1267 (1998) (noting that, during negotiations
between U.S. and Japanese airlines, Senator Jesse Helms “became so disturbed at the direction
U.S. negotiators were going with the aviation talks that he sent staff members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee to observe the August 1997 discussions”).
64. For instance, U.S. accession to both the North American Free Trade Agreement and the
World Trade Organization Agreement were secured through the “fast track” authority given to the
President by Congress. See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L.
No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3311–3473); see also Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified in scattered
sections of 19 U.S.C.). Although the availability of fast-track, or “trade promotion,” authority has
lapsed under the Obama Administration, its longstanding role in U.S. international trade relations
suggests that it will return when political temperaments concerning trade and globalization adjust
to current worldwide economic circumstances. See generally Robert E. Baldwin, U.S. Trade
Policy Since 1934: An Uneven Path Toward Greater Trade Liberalization (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 15397, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15397/.
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under the auspices of the DOS and DOT.65 The policy space left by Congress
allows the DOT to create an “Open Skies” negotiating template that seeks to
remove many market access restrictions at the international level.66 These
accords have often come at the price of antitrust dispensations for foreign air
carriers seeking to forge deeply integrated alliances with U.S. airlines.67
Notably, Congress, has not taken an express position on this mode of
exchange, choosing instead to monitor the matter at irregular intervals.68
Although few international aviation analysts quibble with the liberalization
ethos of Open Skies,69 some have questioned the wisdom of incorporating
antitrust immunity into the agenda.70 Despite these critiques, mainly academic
in nature, Congress remains unmoved.71 Interest groups’ concerns, such as
those expressed by organized labor72 and consumer watchdogs,73 have also
65. See supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text.
66. The DOT’s policy does not remove all market restrictions. For instance, Open Skies
does not provide foreign investment opportunities or cabotage privileges such as the right of a
foreign airline to serve domestic routes within another state’s territory. See generally Defining
“Open Skies”, supra note 12. See also Current Model Open Skies Agreement Text, DEP’T OF
STATE, at arts. 2–4 (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ata/114866.htm.
67. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-95-99, INTERNATIONAL
AVIATION: AIRLINE ALLIANCES PRODUCE BENEFITS, BUT EFFECT ON COMPETITION UNCERTAIN
2 (1995); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-RCED-98-131, AVIATION COMPETITION:
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION ALLIANCES AND THE INFLUENCE OF AIRLINE MARKETING
PRACTICES 1 (1998); see also International Aviation Alliances: Market Turmoil and the Future of
Airline Competition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Business Rights, and
Competition of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Nov. 7, 2001); supra note 29
(discussing the failed attempt of former Congressman James Oberstar to reign in the DOT’s
antitrust immunity powers).
69. See Xiaowen Fu et al., Air Transport Liberalization and Its Impacts on Airline
Competition and Air Passenger Traffic, 49 TRANSP. J. 24, 25 (2010) (highlighting the impacts of
liberalization on the international air markets); see also Anca Cristea & David Hummels,
Estimating the Gains from Liberalizing Services Trade: The Case of Passenger Aviation 6-7
(Sept. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (discussing the link between Open Skies Agreements,
price changes, and demand, and noting that strict regulation “discourag[ed] efficiency and
innovation”), available at http://econ.la.psu.edu/papers/Hummels91611.pdf. Despite these
benefits, the worldwide economic decline that began in 2008 has limited some of the projected
gains from air transport liberalization. See, e.g., Dipasis Bhadra & Roger Schaufele, Impact of
U.S.-EU Open Aviation Area Treaty on U.S. Aviation: A Parametric Analysis with Simulation, 48
TRANSP. RESEARCH FORUM 65, 67–72 (2009).
70. See, e.g., HAVEL, supra note 23, at 301–02; Horan, supra note 24, at 283–86.
71. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing a failed effort in Congress to limit
the DOT’s authority to grant antitrust immunity).
72. See Bartholomew Sullivan, Labor Unions Announce a Partnership to Counter Global
APPEAL
(Apr.
20,
2011,
5:20
PM),
Airline
Alliances,
COM.
http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2011/apr/20/labor-unions-announce-partnership-counter
-global-a/.
73. See Charlie Leocha, Airline Alliance Realities: Airlines Win, Consumers Lose,
CONSUMER TRAVELER (Mar. 26, 2009), http://www.consumertraveler.com/today/airline-alliance
-realities-airlines-win-consumers-lose/.
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been unsuccessful, perhaps because they failed to marshal strong public
support. None of these objections, however, take to heart the institutional
advantages the DOT possesses with respect to forming international aviation
policy and executing that policy in cooperation with the DOS.74 These
objections miss the point: even though antitrust immunity for alliances may be
“bad” or trading Open Skies-for-Immunity fails to comport with some abstract
notion of how international aviation is “supposed” to work,75 there is no
ready-at-hand institutional alternative to the status quo.76
II. THE WAYS AND MEANS OF ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
A. Historical Background
Since the inception of international aviation’s modern legal regime in
1944,77 airlines seeking foreign market access rights have been tethered to a
series of domestic and international restrictions.78 This framework requires
airlines to remain “substantially owned” and “effectively controlled” by
nationals of their home states (i.e., the state in which an airline is incorporated
and has its principal place of business).79 Although the exact meaning of the
ownership/control criteria remains unclear,80 particularly as a matter of
international law,81 the effect of this restrictive dyad is unambiguous: no single
airline is legally permitted to develop an autonomous global-route network,
whether through the acquisition of foreign airlines or the establishment of

74. See infra Part IV (detailing the various complaints and proposed alternative paths to the
current alliance-granting regime).
75. Distributional goals are at the heart of both labor and consumer-advocacy objections.
Organized labor fears, perhaps rightly, that alliances allow U.S. airlines to outsource jobs by
shifting international carriage to foreign airlines with lower cost structures. See Sullivan, supra
note 72. Consumers who fear higher ticket prices and decreased service offerings are
understandably suspicious that allied airlines are extracting economic rents through their
cartel-like behavior. See Leocha, supra note 73.
76. See infra Part IV (raising and dismissing alternatives to the status quo).
77. See generally Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature Dec. 7,
1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (entered into force Apr. 4, 1947). See also Brian F. Havel
& Gabriel S. Sanchez, Do We Need a New Chicago Convention?, 11 ISSUES AVIATION L. &
POL’Y 7, 10 (2011) (defending the current regime on pragmatic grounds).
78. See Havel & Sanchez, supra note 7, at 644–48.
79. Id. at 648–53.
80. The “control” criterion is, at best, ambiguous and lends itself to a case-by-case analysis
of an airline’s management structure, contracts, and financial arrangements. See Recommended
Decision of Administrative Law Judge, DHL Airways, Inc. (ASTAR), Docket No.
OST-2002-13089-594, at 35–38 (Dep’t of Transp. Dec. 19, 2003), 2003 DOT Av. LEXIS 1086
(discussing the interpretation of “actual control” in U.S. administrative law).
81. This is because aviation agreements, unlike domestic legal codes, fail to provide a
numeric benchmark for “ownership.” See, e.g., Air Transport Agreement, U.S.-EU, Apr. 30,
2007, 46 ILM 467. As in U.S. domestic law, “control” remains undefined. See supra note 80.
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subsidiaries abroad.82 For instance, Germany’s Lufthansa cannot merge with
United Airlines, because a German owned-and-controlled United would violate
both U.S. domestic law and treaty commitments.83 Major air-transport markets
such as China and Russia could, under the terms of their air services
agreements (ASAs) with the United States, revoke United’s privilege to fly to
and from their respective territories on the grounds that United is no longer
owned-and-controlled by American citizens.84 Because more than ninety
percent of all extant ASAs feature “nationality clauses” of this sort,85 it is
nearly impossible for an international airline to have a foreign-ownership
profile while successfully accessing lucrative markets.86
Against this backdrop, airlines have sought to circumvent ownership
restrictions by forging alliances with foreign airlines that would allow them to
create a global-route network while continuing to behave like a single, merged
entity.87 Although the earliest alliances that emerged in the early 1990s were
bilateral in nature,88 today’s market landscape boasts three major global
alliances—oneworld, SkyTeam, and Star—comprised of several large
international airlines accompanied by a series of smaller, regional airlines.89
82. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 40102(a)(15), 41101(a), 41102(a) (2006); see also supra notes 8–10
and accompanying text. The one notable exception to this situation is the European Union’s
formation of a common aviation market that allows intra-EU cross-border mergers such as Air
France/KLM and British Airways/Iberia. See MARTIN STANILAND, A EUROPE OF THE AIR? THE
AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 267–68 (2008). One should be careful not to
make too much of this, however, because the EU behaves at least as a single quasi-state for
economic purposes. ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM 92 (2009).
83. See Havel & Sanchez, supra note 7, at 640–41.
84. See Civil Air Transport Agreement, U.S.-China, arts. 3–4, Sept. 17, 1980, 33 U.S.T.
4559; see also Air Transport Agreement, U.S.-Rus., arts. 3–4, Jan. 14, 1994, KAV 3785,
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/114333.pdf. Though both agreements
have been amended over the years, their ownership and control criteria remain in force.
85. See Council for Trade in Services, Quantitative Air Services Agreements Review
(QUASAR): Part B: Preliminary Results, at 33, ¶ 61, S/C/W/270/Add.1 (Nov. 30, 2006).
86. However, some states are exhibiting greater tolerance for foreign investment in their
national airlines while enforcement of nationality clauses wanes. See Havel & Sanchez, supra
note 7, at 654–58 (discussing selective U.S. waivers to nationality clause violations, the creation
of a unified EU aviation market, and airline lobbying efforts to erode nationality clauses); see
also Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5, at 26–28 (discussing the potential for relaxed ownership
restrictions in the context of Canada/EU aviation relations). The cold truth still remains that these
restrictions could be invoked at any time and thus far have successfully dissuaded major
cross-border mergers from taking place. See, e.g., Havel & Sanchez, supra note 7, at 653–54
(explaining how the United States invoked nationality rules to prevent a proposed airline merger).
87. Northwest/KLM Order to Show Cause, supra note 4, at 4; Order to Show Cause, United
Airlines, Inc. and Deutsche Lufthansa, A.G., Docket No. OST-96-1116, at 1 (Dep’t of Transp.
May 9, 1996), 1996 DOT Av. LEXIS 300 [hereinafter United/Lufthansa Order to Show Cause];
Volodymyr Bilotkach & Kai Hüschelrath, Airlines Alliances and Antitrust Policy: The Role of
Efficiencies, 21 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 76, 78 (2012).
88. See, e.g., Northwest/KLM Order to Show Cause, supra note 4, at 4; United/Lufthansa
Order to Show Cause, supra note 87, at 1 (Dep’t of Transp. May 9, 1996).
89. See Bilotkach & Hüschelrath, supra note 87, at 76.
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For example, the Star Alliance—anchored by United Airlines and
Lufthansa—has twenty-seven members, including Air Canada, Singapore
Airlines, and Japan’s All Nippon Airways.90 Though not every member is
integrated into the alliance with full antitrust immunity, the main actors are.91
Immunized airlines are allowed to structure their commercial operations as if
they are a single, merged entity, including abandoning routes where the
members once competed.92 Each of the big three global alliances share with its
members a common marketing scheme and pool its consumer perquisite
programs, such as frequent flyer miles and airport lounge access.93 More
controversially, alliance members are, in accordance with marching orders
implied by the DOT,94 committed to “metal neutrality,” “an industry term
meaning that the partners in an alliance are indifferent as to which operates the
‘metal’ (aircraft) when they jointly market services.”95 Thus, instead of metalneutral alliance members divvying up their revenues based on the amount of
carriage each conducts, an alliance member can be compensated for
performing no service at all.96
Unsurprisingly, alliances raise competition concerns to varying degrees
depending on the regulatory culture of the concerned states and the extent to
which the airlines have been able to “sell” the consumer benefits.97 Further,
90. See Member Airlines, STAR ALLIANCE http://www.staralliance.com/en/about/member
_airlines/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2012).
91. Bill Poling, Star Alliance Gets Continental and Antitrust Immunity, TRAVEL WKLY.
(July 10, 2009), http://www.travelweekly.com/Travel-News/Airline-News/Star-Alliance-gets
-Continental-and-antitrust-immunity/.
92. A base-level aspect of alliance integration is the practice of code-sharing, whereby
alliance partners place their identifier codes on the same flight, regardless of which airline
provides the carriage. Under this practice, United Airlines can sell seats on flights between
Washington, D.C., and Madrid, Spain, with its identification code on the ticket while Irish airline
Aer Lingus uses its aircraft and crew to provide the actual service. See Press Release, United
Airlines, United Airlines, Aer Lingus Announce Codeshare and Frequent Flyer Cooperation (Apr.
8, 2008), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/04/08/idUS108695+08-Apr
-2008+PRN20080408.
93. Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5, at 37.
94. Though the term has only recently appeared on DOT decisions, the existence of “metal
neutrality” in a heavily integrated alliance agreement now appears to be an established
requirement for antitrust immunity.
See, e.g., Order, Air Canada, Docket No.
DOT-OST-2008-0234, at 4, 10 (Dep’t of Transp. Nov. 14, 2011); Show Cause Order, Delta
Airlines, Inc., Docket No. DOT-OST-2009-0155, at 2 n.4 (Dep’t of Transp. May 10, 2011), 2011
DOT Av. LEXIS 223; see also Bilotkach & Hüschelrath, supra note 87, at 80–81 (providing a
more detailed explication of the metal-neutral concept).
95. Show Cause Order, American Airlines, Inc., Docket No. DOT-OST-2008-0252, at 4 n.6
(Dep’t of Transp. Feb. 13, 2010), 2010 DOT Av. LEXIS 136 [hereinafter oneworld Alliance
Order].
96. See Bilotkach & Hüschelrath, supra note 87, at 80–81.
97. See oneworld Alliance Order, supra note 95, at 2–3 (summarizing concerns over
immunizing the oneworld Alliance but finding the benefits great enough to warrant antitrust
immunity).
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every major industrial and post-industrial economy has competition or antitrust
rules that frown upon the type of cartelization in which alliances engage.98 In
the United States, the Sherman and Clayton Acts are intended to function as a
bulwark against typical alliance behavior insofar as the Sherman Act prohibits
“[e]very contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy in restraint of trade or
commerce,”99 while the Clayton Act targets the acquisition of monopoly power
through mergers.100 Presumably, the existence of these statutes, along with the
matrix of public and private interests in seeing them vigorously enforced
against commercial entities, should have converged to strangle alliances.101
But, because of the aviation industry’s unique regulatory history, allied airlines
can supplicate the DOT to shield them from antitrust exposure.102
Without getting bogged down in the details of aviation’s ancien régime, it is
necessary to note that the CAB enjoyed many privileges before the policy
revolution that prompted deregulation in the 1970s103 and the termination of
the CAB in 1984.104 These included monitoring, approving, and, if needed,
immunizing all airline mergers and inter-carrier commercial agreements
without direct recourse from U.S. antitrust statutes.105 Because cross-border
mergers and acquisitions were prohibited under domestic and international
law, the CAB primarily directed international regulatory authority to approve
transnational price-fixing schemes brokered by the industry’s global trade
group, the International Air Transport Association (IATA).106 Alliances were
not yet on the radar.107 The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 slightly modified

98. See TONY A. FREYER, ANTITRUST AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM: 1930-2004, at 1–7 (2006)
(introducing an explanation of the reason for and the extent of global antitrust rules).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
100. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2006) (described as “[a]n Act to protect trade and commerce
against unlawful restraints and monopolies”).
101. But see Jerry L. Beane, The Antitrust Implications of Airline Deregulation, 45 J. AIR L.
& COM. 1001, 1001–04 (1980) (noting that “[c]ompetition was a secondary consideration in the
economic regulation of the aviation industry”).
102. See id. at 1001–03 (explaining how deregulation led to the demise of automatic antitrust
immunity); see also supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing the primary mission of the
DOT, which does not include antitrust management).
103. See Beane, supra note 101, at 1001.
104. See Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703
(codified in scattered sections of Titles 5, 15, 16, 26, 29, and 49 U.S.C.).
105. See Beane, supra note 101, at 1008, 1011 (describing privileges afforded to the CAB to
immunize airline agreements from antitrust liability before deregulation).
106. See Brian F. Havel & Gabriel S. Sanchez, International Air Transport Association, in
HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE REGIMES 755, 756–60 (Christian
Tietje & Alan Brouder eds., 2009).
107. See James Reitzes & Diana Moss, Airline Alliances and Systems Competition, 45
HOUSE. L. REV. 293, 303–04 (2008) (examining the history of antitrust immunity and airline
alliances, which attracted greater scrutiny in the years following the DOT’s first grant of
immunity in 1992).
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the CAB’s antitrust powers.108 After 1984, Congress transferred these powers
to the DOT before this authority, with respect to domestic aviation, expired in
1989.109 Today, U.S. airlines remain subject to antitrust statutes with respect
to domestic transactions like the 2010 Continental/United Airlines merger,110
predatory pricing, and other allegedly anticompetitive behavior.111 With
respect to the international arena, however, Congress allowed the DOT to
retain the old CAB powers112 because the global aviation marketplace
remained a heavily regulated environment. The marketplace remained heavily
regulated due to the aforementioned restrictions on foreign airline ownership113
and the unwillingness of states to grant open-market access rights to foreign
airlines.114 Despite the steady erosion of these market-access barriers over the
past twenty years, nationality restrictions remain at the forefront of airline
alliance apologetics for antitrust immunity.115
That is only part of the story. From the inception of the first airline alliance
in 1992—a joint venture between the extinct Northwest Airlines and Dutch
flag carrier KLM—U.S. aviation policymakers saw an opportunity to use
immunity grants as a coin of exchange in pursuit of Open Skies agreements
with foreign governments.116 Although these agreements initially offered only
“sympathetic consideration” for immunity applications from alliances
comprised of carriers from states that had signed-on to the Open Skies
template,117 Open Skies-for-Immunity quickly became the new order of the
day.118 Indeed, the DOT’s immunization quasi-jurisprudence now confirms
108. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 30(a), 92 Stat. 1705, 1731
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (2006)) (allowing the Board to exempt a specific
transaction from antitrust laws if it was “required in the public interest”).
109. See Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984 § 3 (transferring authority to the DOT
and sunsetting that authority in 1989); see also Dean & Shane, supra note 19, at 18.
110. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, United Airlines and Cont’l Airlines Transfer Assets
to Southwest Airlines in Response to Dep’t of Justice’s Antitrust Concerns (Aug. 27, 2010),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/August/10-at-974.html.
111. See Gustavo Mathias Alves Pinto, Competition and Predation in the Airline Industry, 74
J. AIR L. & COM. 3, 5–9 (2009) (detailing the main allegations of predatory behavior in the airline
industry).
112. Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984 § 9(f); see also Dean & Shane, supra note
19, at 18.
113. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
114. See Havel & Sanchez, supra note 77, at 8.
115. Id.
116. See Reitzes & Moss, supra note 107, at 304–05.
117. See, e.g., Northwest/KLM Order, supra note 4, at 1, 3 (quoting the 1992 Memorandum
of Consultations between the United States and the Netherlands); Order Granting Approval and
Antitrust Immunity for an Alliance Expansion Agreement, United Air Lines, Inc., Docket No.
OST-2003-14202, at 1–2 & n.5 (Dep’t of Transp. May 14, 2003), 2003 DOT Av. LEXIS 357
[hereinafter United/Asiana Order] (citing the Memorandum of Consultations between the United
States and the Republic of Korea).
118. See Defining “Open Skies”, supra note 12; see also Dean & Shane, supra note 19, at 17.
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that an Open Skies agreement is conditio sine qua non for antitrust immunity,
while alliance applications themselves do not hide the fact that “no immunity”
means “no Open Skies.”119 This reality has not sat well with a handful of
stakeholders and academics, all of whom have argued that the DOT is bound to
statutory rules that dictate the terms under which immunization may be
offered.120
B. Legal Framework
The statutory rules governing antitrust immunity grants have arguably
played an ambiguous role in DOT decision-making.121 Under a two-step
framework, the DOT is required first to approve or deny an alliance agreement
between U.S. airlines and one or more foreign air carriers and, second, to
determine whether or not to extend antitrust immunity to an approved
agreement.122 Although the DOT may, without antitrust immunity, approve
alliance arrangements with foreign airlines from states that have not signed an
Open Skies agreement, these airlines are unable to take advantage of the
standard menu of alliance activities without risking an antitrust lawsuit.123
Thus, those airlines seeking high-octane alliance benefits seek both approval
and immunity when submitting their petitions to the DOT.124 Even then, the
DOT can choose to offer approval without immunity, but such instances are
rare and can be remedied through a subsequent petition.125 The typical
scenario involves the approval dog wagging its immunity tail without much
incident.126
More formally, under 49 U.S.C. § 41309, which governs the first step, the
DOT is directed to approve an alliance so long as the “cooperative
arrangement” is “not adverse to the public interest” nor in violation of other
119. See, e.g., ANA/Continental/United Application, supra note 15, at 6 n.9 (stating that in
the recent U.S.-Japan negotiations, “the Japanese delegation unambiguously communicated that
U.S. approval of [the ANA/Continental/United] Joint Application [for antitrust immunity] on
terms acceptable to the Japanese government is a condition precedent to the entry into force of
Open Skies”); Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5, at 37.
120. See Dean & Shane, supra note 19, at 20; see also infra Part III.A–B (discussing
additional critiques).
121. See infra notes 181–83 (surveying Havel’s critique that the DOT has failed to follow the
statutes that underlie its antitrust immunity powers).
122. See Dean & Shane, supra note 19, at 18–19; see also Gillespie & Richard, supra note
20, at 5–6 (explaining that an alliance may be granted without a grant of antitrust immunity).
123. See Hand, supra note 4, at 656.
124. See Dean & Shane, supra note 19, at 21.
125. See, e.g., Order to Show Cause, Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-S.P.A., Docket No.
OST-2004-19214, at 2 (Dep’t of Transp. Dec. 22, 2005), 2005 DOT Av. LEXIS 820 [hereinafter
SkyTeam I Order] (granting SkyTeam approval but no antitrust immunity). But see Show Cause
Order, Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-S.p.A., Order to Show Cause, Docket No. OST-2007-28644,
at 1 (Dep’t of Transp. Apr. 9, 2008) [hereinafter Skyteam II Order] (granting SkyTeam’s revised
application for antitrust immunity).
126. See Dean & Shane, supra note 19, at 19.
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statutory criteria related to airline operating fitness.127 This requires the DOT
to question whether the proposed alliance would “substantially reduce[] or
eliminate[] competition”128 and, if so, whether “the agreement . . . is necessary
to meet a serious transportation need or to achieve important public benefits
including international comity and foreign policy considerations.”129 Further,
the DOT must determine whether “the transportation need cannot be met or
those benefits cannot be achieved by reasonably available alternatives that are
materially less anticompetitive.”130 Because all alliances, by their nature,
“substantially reduce[] or eliminate[] competition,” the DOT has never been
able to dispense with an ostensibly full-bodied approval analysis.131
Approval, however, does not mean immunization. The DOT is purportedly
restricted to granting antitrust immunity only “to the extent necessary to allow
the [airlines] to proceed with the [alliance] transaction,” and only if the DOT
“decides it is required by the public interest.”132 Though past DOT decisions
have reinforced the idea that applicant airlines must make a “strong showing”
that their arrangement is in the “public interest” and would not go forward but
for immunization,133 they are far from bastions of clarity. For instance,
although the term “public interest” appears in both the approval and
immunization statutory steps, and the DOT claims to have “always recognized
that the public interest standard [for antitrust immunity] is a much more
stringent standard than [the alliance approval] public interest standard,”134
there is no avoiding the term’s vagueness or the DOT’s discretionary use, or
lack, of stringency.135 Moreover, the idea that the DOT, an external observer,
127. 49 U.S.C. § 41309(b) (2006); see also Gillespie & Richard, supra note 20, at 5.
128. This language is from the Clayton Act. See 49 U.S.C. § 41309(b)(1) (2006); see also
Order, Air Canada, DOT-OST-2008-0234, at 5 (Dep’t of Transp. Nov. 14, 2011), 2011 DOT Av.
LEXIS 492 [hereinafter Order Joining Brussels Airlines to the Star Alliance] (discussing the
Clayton Act and its application).
129. 49 U.S.C. § 41309(b)(1)(A).
130. Id. § 41309(b)(1)(B).
131. Id. § 41309(b)(1)(A); see also Reitzes & Moss, supra note 107, at 307 (describing the
benefits of immunized alliances but noting their ability to negatively affect competition).
132. 49 U.S.C. § 41308(b) (2006). With respect to limiting the scope of antitrust immunity,
the DOT may, at its discretion, “carve out” certain international air routes from an immunity
grant, though it appears to be drifting away from that practice. See oneworld Alliance Order,
supra note 95, at 25–26 (citing economic data to justify not carving out routes from the 2010
oneworld Alliance application). In addition to carve-outs, the DOT may order alliance members
to surrender some of their take-off and landing rights (“slots”) at congested airports in order to
attract new entrants. See id. at 26.
133. See, e.g., United/Lufthansa Order to Show Cause, supra note 87, at 15–16.
134. SkyTeam I Order, supra note 125, at 32.
135. Compare Order Joining Brussels Airlines to the Star Alliance, supra note 128, at 9
(weighing enhanced competition, cost efficiencies, and new airline routes when granting antitrust
immunity), with SkyTeam I Order, supra note 125, at 34 (deciding that efficiency from the
combination of previously approved alliance agreements was not a sufficient public benefit for a
broad grant of antitrust immunity).
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has keen enough insight to know with absolute certainty whether an alliance
transaction will go forward with or without immunity borders on the ludicrous.
Given the antitrust risks involved with an alliance, coupled with the stiff
statutory penalties, it is difficult to imagine a consortium of airlines proceeding
to engage in routine alliance behavior without immunization.136
As noted, in addition to these statutory criteria, it is “established
policy . . . [that] the existence of an ‘open-skies’ framework [between the U.S.
and foreign airlines’ homelands] is a necessary predicate to [the DOT’s]
consideration of requests for antitrust immunity.”137 So, too, is “metal
neutral[ity].”138 Moreover, although industry stakeholders and government
officials are permitted to submit filings during the alliance application process,
the DOT is not required by law to consult with any other agency, including
antitrust officials at the DOJ.139 This means that, legally, the DOT possesses
plenipotentiary powers over alliance approval and immunization even though it
is not authorized to handle competition law and policy generally.140 Further,
because no DOT alliance immunity decision has been appealed to federal
court, there is no clear jurisprudence clarifying or constraining these
immunization powers.141 Certain older decisions, handed down during the
CAB’s reign over airline antitrust affairs, may be construed to inform the
nature of DOT immunization authority today,142 but they appear to have no
effect on DOT decisions in practice.143
III. TWO LINES OF CRITIQUE
Considering the strength of the DOT’s antitrust immunity powers and the
apparent absence of legal checks on its institutional authority, it should come
as no surprise that twenty years’ worth of immunity grants have raised the

136. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006) (making a Sherman Act violation punishable by up to ten
years in prison, a $100 million fine, or both).
137. oneworld Alliance Order, supra note 95, at 3.
138. Id. at 5 & n.14.
139. See 49 U.S.C. § 41309(b) (2006) (granting the DOT sole authority to approve a
proposed airline alliance). But see id. § 41309(c) (requiring the DOT to give the DOS and the
Attorney General notice and an opportunity to comment on all applications).
140. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 43–44 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing the DOJ
and FTC’s roles in enforcing the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts).
141. But see Republic Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 756 F.3d 1304, 1318 (8th Cir.
1985) (applying a rational basis test when reviewing an antitrust exemption issued by the
now-defunct CAB).
142. See Comments of the Department of Justice on the Show Cause Order (Public Version),
Air Canada, Docket No. OST-2008-0234, at 12–13 (Dep’t of Transp. Jun. 26, 2009) [hereinafter
DOJ Comments on Star Alliance Show Cause Order] (citing Republic Airlines, 756 F.2d at 1317).
143. See, e.g., Final Order, Air Canada, Docket No. OST-2008-0234, at 7–10 (Dep’t of
Transp. Jul. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Star Alliance Final Order] (rejecting the DOJ’s suggestions to
deny an amended application requesting immunity); see also DOJ Comments on Star Alliance
Show Cause Order, supra note 142.
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hackles of certain stakeholders and academics,144 nor should there be any
shock that the DOJ, the government’s primary competition law enforcer, has
routinely expressed its disapproval of alliance immunization.145 Although
interest group objections help reveal the extent to which the alliance system
has reorganized the international aviation market and clarify whom the winners
and losers are within the framework, they are of ancillary relevance here.146
Special interest lobbying has been unsuccessful in guiding the DOT’s
regulatory hand and spurring lawmakers to reform the immunization
statutes.147 There are two distinct, yet interrelated, trajectories of complaints
against the DOT’s immunization grants: economic and legalist. Because these
two concerns carry the potential to inform public discourse on the future of
antitrust immunity for alliances and have been areas of focus for academic
critics,148 they warrant specified treatment. They are both, however, ultimately
irrelevant on institutional grounds.149
A. Ersatz Economics?
The economic literature on airline alliances is as vast as it is contentious,
allowing both alliance supporters and critics to claim the empirical high ground
in debates concerning immunity grants.150 The standard theoretical defense of
immunized alliances is that they provide unprecedented network benefits to
consumers, allowing consumers living in relatively small aviation markets to
access thousands of destinations worldwide.151 Even though the formation of

144. See, e.g., Hand, supra note 4, at 658–62 (criticizing the DOT’s grant of antitrust
immunity for the Star Alliance’s A++ alliance agreement).
145. See, e.g., DOJ Comments on Star Alliance Show Cause Order, supra note 142, at 1
(arguing that laws granting antitrust immunity “should be strongly disfavored”).
146. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Star Alliance Final Order, supra note 143, at 23 (rejecting the Interactive
Travel Services Association and American Society of Travel Agents’ objection that granting
alliance immunization would harm travel agents).
148. These academic critiques are, at best, incomplete and, at worst, haphazard. This could
be said of almost any attempt by academics to set and direct public policy. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY OF DECLINE 166 (2001) (“[T]he public is sometimes
misled by a public intellectual.”); THOMAS SOWELL, INTELLECTUALS AND SOCIETY 282–83
(2009) (noting that public intellectuals may attempt to use “blatant examples of illogic” to support
their claims).
149. See infra Part IV.
150. See, e.g. Reitzes & Moss, supra note 107, at 305 (noting that immunity grants can lead
to “lower airfares . . . because alliance partners can coordinate pricing and share revenue” but
“[t]his may eliminate competition among alliance members on the same gateway-to-gateway
routes”).
151. Cf. Michael E. Levine, Airline Alliances and Systems Competition: Antitrust Policy
Toward Airlines and the Department of Justice Guidelines, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 333, 335–39 (2008)
(explaining that the main way to build networks is by developing a “fortress hub . . . designed to
offer frequent, cost-effective service to travelers who value[] frequent and convenient service in
markets too small to support service on a stand alone basis”).
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those networks may remove competition on certain route segments, the
benefits of the whole outweigh the losses to the parts.152
Moreover, reductions in competition within a given alliance are allegedly
offset by competition between alliances, even if they use distinct routing plans
to move consumers from their starting point to their destination. For instance,
a passenger traveling from Grand Rapids, Michigan, to Frankfurt, Germany,
may be routed by the Star Alliance from Grand Rapids to United’s hub at
Chicago O’Hare.153 From there, the passenger would be placed on a Lufthansa
flight bound out of Chicago for Frankfurt.154 SkyTeam—anchored by Delta
Air Lines and Air France/KLM—may route the same passenger through
Delta’s Detroit hub and onward to Frankfurt on a flight operated by KLM.155
The passenger’s choice over which alliance to use will be informed by the
usual array of preference factors, including cost, travel times, and perquisites.
A passenger who regularly travels on United Airlines for U.S. domestic air
service may opt to go with the Star Alliance because his or her entire
journey—including the portion flown by Lufthansa—will contribute reward
miles.156 Whether inter-alliance competition is sufficient to keep prices in
check and service offerings high remains a matter of debate.157 The emergence
of non-allied global carriers like Emirates, which uses its super-hub in Dubai
as a swivel point from which to move passengers between Europe and points in
Asia and Africa, may act as additional discipline on alliance fares and
services.158
According to some of the alliances’ and the DOT’s economic critics, this is
all beside the point because the DOT fails to follow not only the economic
tests implied in the statutory criteria for alliance approval and immunization

152. Cf. id. at 335 (“Networks are very valuable to some time- and transaction-cost-sensitive
customers who are willing to pay a lot to use them and . . . offer benefits through joint production
and price discrimination to price-sensitive customers”).
153. See Bilotkach & Hüschelrath, supra note 87, at 77 (explaining code-sharing and noting
that the current Star Alliance includes the United Airlines-Lufthansa partnership).
154. See id.
155. See id. (explaining how the SkyTeam alliance evolved from the Delta Airlines-Air
France partnership).
156. See id. (noting that the “sharing of customer loyalty (i.e., frequent flyer) programs
[among airline alliance members] is very common”).
157. See Reitzes & Moss, supra note 107, at 328 (2008) (concluding that “empirical analysis
raises questions as to whether immunized alliances are continuing to deliver unequivocal benefits
to consumers”).
158. Despite its strong competition position, Emirates has launched an extensive public
campaign against the alliance system and antitrust immunity in the name of enhancing global
airline competition.
See EMIRATES, AVIATION AT THE CROSSROADS: SAFEGUARDING
CONSUMER CHOICE (2011), available at http://www.emirates.com/zm/english/images/Aviation
_at_the_crossroads_Aug11%5B1%5D-tem530-713620.pdf (stating, “[g]overnments should
investigate and, if appropriate, intervene to stop alliance activities aimed at thwarting independent
competitors”).
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but also U.S. antitrust policy writ large.159 Hubert Horan bases his complaints
on the fact that the statutory language for alliance approval echoes of language
found in the Clayton Act, which leads him to assert that the DOJ/FTC Antitrust
Guidelines for Collaborations Amongst Competitors and Horizontal Merger
Guidelines provide the controlling tests that the DOT should apply when
evaluating alliance applications.160 Horan conveniently ignores, however, that
neither set of guidelines has the force of law. Moreover, Horan fails to cite a
single statute, regulation, or decision mandating the DOT to incorporate these
documents into its immunization decisions.161 Horan—who is not an
attorney162—largely repeats the DOJ’s arguments from their opposition to the
Star Alliance’s immunity application.163 The DOT, however, is under no legal
obligation to adhere to the DOJ’s opinions, no matter how cogently reasoned
or well footnoted.164 At most, the DOJ’s comments, like Horan’s own
regularly filed objections to antitrust immunity grants,165 provide food for

159. Cf. Horan, supra note 24, at 252–53 (alleging that DOT immunity grants “were based on
willful non-enforcement of the Clayton Act market power test and the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines’ requirement that applicants present verifiable, case-specific evidence of public
benefits”); Reitzes & Moss, supra note 107, at 327–28 (questioning whether the DOT’s attempt
to promote inter-alliance competition through its immunity grants has provided “sufficient
competitive benefits”).
160. See Horan, supra note 24, at 254 (noting that the Antitrust Guidelines and Horizontal
Merger Guidelines define the standards to be used in determining whether immunity can be
granted).
161. See id. (failing to provide any law requiring the DOT to incorporate the Antitrust
Guidelines in its decision-making).
HORAN
AVIATION,
162. Bio/Experience,
HUBERT
http://horanaviation.com/Bio_Experience.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2012).
163. See DOJ Comments on Star Alliance Show Cause Order, supra note 142, at 12–13
(noting “an application for immunity must . . . make a ‘strong showing’ that, from the standpoint
of public interest, the predicted value of antitrust immunity is greater than the proven value of the
normal antitrust regime”). The DOT expressly rejected this attempt in its final decision. See Star
Alliance Final Order, supra note 143, at 10 (holding that “[w]hile DOJ has suggested that less
anticompetitive measures are available and that immunity does not benefit consumers, we are not
persuaded to alter our fundamental initial assessment of the Joint Applicants’ request”).
164. See, e.g. Gillespie & Richard, supra note 20, at 1 (recognizing that the “DOT has the
statutory authority to approve and immunize from U.S. antitrust laws agreements relating to
international air transportation”).
165. See, e.g., Supplemental Comments of Hubert Horan, American Airlines, Docket No.
DOT-OST-2008-0252, at 20 (Dep’t of Transp. Jan. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Horan oneworld
Supplemental Comments] (opposing the oneworld Alliance on the grounds that it failed to carry
its burden of proof in “requesting exemption from . . . antitrust laws”); Comments of Hubert
Horan on the Department of Justice Public Comments of 26 June 2009, Air Canada, Docket No.
OST-2008-0234 (Dep’t of Transp. Jul. 3, 2009) [hereinafter Horan Comments to DOJ’s Star
Alliance Comments] (opposing the Star Alliance on the grounds that it provided insufficient
evidence to substantiate a claim for immunity).

2012]

Institutional Defense of Airline Alliance Antitrust Immunity

161

thought to DOT regulators.
Their analytical force, however, cannot
compensate for their legal irrelevance.166
Additionally, Horan, along with economists Volodymyr Bilotkach and Kai
Hüschelrath, are vexed that DOT antitrust immunity decisions do not align
with U.S. antitrust policy goals.167 But why should that matter? Antitrust
immunity, on its face, is a statutory exception to the contemporary legal ethos
that “[t]he antitrust laws are intended to protect competition, not
competitors.”168 It is difficult to imagine how immunity can ever interface
with an antitrust policy that is supposed to be “vigorous”169 while “promot[ing]
a narrow but well-defined goal—namely, long-run efficiency” upheld by
“condemn[ing] conduct likely to result in diminished industrial output and
increased market prices.”170 Short of eliminating the DOT’s authority to grant
antitrust immunity for airline alliances altogether,171 even fresh limitations on
DOT immunization powers would likely still provide some latitude for the
DOT to place alliances beyond the reach of U.S. antitrust law.172 The DOT’s
critics may welcome modest reform over no reform, but they fail to account for
the cost of limiting the DOT’s larger international aviation policy goals. The
economic critics, who are hardly uniform in the force and depth of their
objections,173 are institutionally walled-off from the “front line” air-services
negotiations conducted jointly by the DOT and the DOS.174 The economic
critics’ implied suggestion that abstract concepts of economic efficiency fueled

166. See, e.g. Gillespie & Richard, supra note 20, at 1 (noting that Congress vested the DOT
with statutory authority to grant antitrust immunity for airline alliances).
167. See Bilotkach & Hüschelrath, supra note 87, at 77–78, 81–82; Horan, supra note 24, at
253–62 (criticizing, among other things, the DOT for “gutting, but not formally eliminating, the
public benefit test of 49 U.S.C. § 41308(b), and the market power test of the Clayton Act” to
streamline the approval process while only “maintain[ing] the superficial appearance of following
the law”).
168. Levine v. Cent. Fla. Med. Affiliates, 72 F.3d 1538, 1551 (11th Cir. 1996).
169. See Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen., Vigorously Enforcing the Antitrust
Laws: Development at the Division, Remarks as Prepared for the Chamber of Commerce,
Washington, D.C., at 3 (June 24, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/272536.pdf
(recalling her pledge “to engage in vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws”).
170. Alan Devlin, Antitrust in an Era of Market Failure, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 557,
565 (2010).
171. Eliminating the DOT’s authority to grant antitrust immunity is supported by some
critics. See, e.g., Horan, supra note 24, at 291 (suggesting that “Congress should consider
shifting international antitrust authority to DOJ”).
172. Cf. 49 U.S.C. §§ 41308–41309 (2006) (affording significant discretion to the DOT to
grant antitrust immunity).
173. Compare, e.g., DOJ Comments on the Star Alliance Show Cause Order, supra note 142,
with Horan Comments to DOJ’s Star Alliance Comments, supra note 165, at 2 (criticizing the
DOJ for “materially understat[ing] the problem” with respect to the DOT’s economic analysis).
174. See 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (2006).
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by contentious theories175 ought to govern DOT decision-making appears to be
a bridge too far.
It is not that Horan, Bilotkach, and Hüschelrath, or the antitrust economists
employed by the DOJ are furnishing bad analytics or that the DOT’s alliance
rulings are paragons of good economics, but that the DOT’s custody of
immunization powers should not depend on the economic integrity of its
decisions. Congress must take the unlikely step of placing explicit economic
concepts and their attendant methodologies into the approval and immunity
statutes before economic critiques of the DOT’s decisions become relevant.176
Considering the absence of any clear political will for imposing such radical
specificity into a congressional grant of customarily open-ended administrative
power, the economic critics will have to remain content to air their grievances
in academic publications and DOT administrative dockets.177
B. Lackluster Legality?
Another line of attack against the DOT’s antitrust immunity decisions is the
legalist critique.
As exemplified by Brian Havel’s review of the
Northwest/KLM and American Airlines/British Airways (AA/BA)
applications,178 the DOT’s rulings are subjected to legalistic review for
compliance with the DOT’s underlying statutory authority. Elements of policy
come into play because the DOT is expected to balance its pro-liberalization
international aviation goals with the general contours of U.S. competition
policy.179 Whether that balancing act is indeed part of the DOT’s mission
statement can be left to the side for the time being. With respect to the DOT’s
quasi-legal analysis of immunity applications, Havel chides the DOT for
allowing Northwestern/KLM and AA/BA to “pass[] the immunization test” for
“explicitly political reasons—in nomine open skies.”180 In the case of
Northwestern/KLM, which rode the coattails of the 1992 U.S./Netherlands
Open Skies agreement, the DOT, according to Havel, dispensed with the
statutory requirements that it “assess[] either transportation needs or public
benefits, as well as the unavailability of any materially less anticompetitive
alternative to meet those needs or benefits[.]”181 In AA/BA, instead of
175. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 976–77 (Elizabeth
Boody Schumpeter ed., 1994).
176. See H.R. 831, 111th Cong. (2009) (providing an example of legislation that would have
limited the DOT’s discretion by requiring a more in-depth economic analysis); see also supra
note 29.
177. See, e.g. Horan oneworld Supplemental Comments, supra note 165, at 3; Horan, supra
note 24, at 253.
178. See HAVEL, supra note 23, at 287–93.
179. See id. at 293–97; see also Hand, supra note 4, at 664–66 (providing an additional
policy-heavy critique).
180. HAVEL, supra note 23, at 294.
181. Id. at 292.
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allegedly dropping portions of the statutory test, the DOT conflated the
statutory steps for approval and immunization, and imposed a “new [market]
entry standard” on the application in order to induce the United Kingdom to
create a de facto Open Skies agreement with the United States by opening up
access to the heavily protected London Heathrow Airport.182 As to the
question of whether the DOT’s legal chicanery was justified in its search for
Open Skies, Havel’s attitude is decidedly cool.183
Havel’s observations, from a strictly legalist perspective, are not without
merit, though their import in the realm of DOT international aviation policy is
questionable.184 Like the aforementioned economic critiques, the legalist
approach is too conceptual to be useful. Though Havel does not offer an
explicit theory of antitrust immunity jurisprudence,185 his criticisms betray an
academic/lawyer-held belief that the DOT or any administrative agency should
be tightly constrained by its underlying statutes.186 The reality is that these
statutes are often open-ended and subject to mixed judicial oversight of
variable intensity.187 Alliance antitrust immunity, thus far, has not been
subject to judicial review.188
Perhaps Havel would prefer, like Horan and the DOJ, for immunity rulings
to resemble mainstream U.S. antitrust analysis, with recourse not just to
economists’ theoretical toolkits, but to the jurisprudence of federal courts as
well.189 Or perhaps he wants a higher degree of consistency than exemplified
by the Northwest/KLM and AA/BA decisions.190 Either way, it is unclear if
182. See id. at 291–92.
183. See id. at 291–92, 301–02.
184. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 41309(b)(1)(A)–(B) (providing an exception allowing alliances
and alliance negotiations that would reduce competition when necessary for “international comity
and foreign policy considerations”); see also Dean & Shane, supra note 19, at 17–18 (noting that
authority to approve and immunize agreements related to international aviation was preserved and
transferred to the DOT from the CAB—a decision Congress made “predicated on a recognition
that competition in international aviation is closely related to, and often a product of, the bilateral
negotiation process,” making it essential that the antitrust exemption authority be “vested in the
agency primarily responsible for the development of U.S. international aviation policy”).
185. See generally HAVEL, supra note 23 (noting in the introduction that a “recurrent theme”
of the book is that air transport should look to “tangible commercial opportunities” rather than its
“historical preoccupation with abstract legal categories”).
186. Cf. id. at 253–78 (surveying various arguments against deregulation and stating that
deregulation failed to deliver lower prices and increase services for consumers); see also POSNER,
supra note 82, at 16–19 (discussing the factors behind legalism in the United States).
187. See POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra note 26, at 84–112; POSNER
& VERMEULE, TERROR, supra note 26, at 15–59 (examining judicial deference to the executive
branch in times of emergency).
188. See infra Part IV.B.
189. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST 46 (2d ed. 2001) (describing the historical ebb
and flow of antitrust cases filed in federal courts).
190. Compare Northwest/KLM Order to Show Cause, supra note 4, at 11–12, with Order to
Show Cause, U.S.-U.K. Alliance Case, Docket No. OST-2001-11029, at 35 (Dep’t of Transp. Jan.
25, 2002), 2002 DOT Av. LEXIS 27. Though AA/BA initially failed to win antitrust immunity

164

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 62:139

deontological fidelity to a thick conception of the rule of law is warranted
where the DOT must view the alliance applications through the lens of
overarching international aviation policy goals.191 Moreover, it is unlikely that
those States that have entered Open Skies-for-Immunity bargains will let the
United States withdraw its half of the transaction on jurisprudential grounds.192
Antitrust immunity is part of the package of payoffs that leaves signatory
States believing they are better off ex post Open Skies than ex ante the
agreement.193 The aspirational norms of legalist theory have no place in the
pragmatist realm of aeropolitical relations.194
IV. AGAINST INSTITUTIONALLY INSENSITIVE REFORM
The terms of the debate concerning antitrust immunity for alliances are
primarily set by academic critiques, though interest groups195 and interagency
conflict196 contributes to the antipathy against the DOT’s immunization powers
and practices. Missing from all of these criticisms is an appreciation for the
DOT’s institutional capacities—capacities that have been aided and abetted by
Congress’s generally laissez-faire approach to U.S. international aviation trade
and the role of antitrust immunity in fulfilling the DOT’s pro-liberalization
policy goals.197 Because the DOT, like other agencies, has distinct advantages
over the legislative branch with respect to generating information and
responding to changing circumstances in international civil aviation it is
unsurprising that Congress has opted to defer to the DOT’s policy judgments
because of the United Kingdom’s unwillingness to enter into an Open Skies agreement with the
United States and relax its historic entrance restrictions at London’s Heathrow Airport, the
airlines were immunized in 2010 following the completion of a comprehensive Open Skies
accord with all twenty-seven members of the European Union. See oneworld Alliance Order,
supra note 95; see also Harriet Oswalt Hill, Comment, Bermuda II: The British Revolution of
1976, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 111, 116–20 (1978) (discussing the historically stormy U.S./U.K.
aeropolitical relations that prompted the closure of Heathrow to all but two U.S. airlines).
191. See 49 U.S.C. § 41309(b)(1)(A) (2006) (enumerating “international comity and foreign
policy consideration” as an important public benefit that the DOT must consider).
192. See, e.g., Dep’t of State, U.S.-Colombia Memorandum of Consultations (Nov.
8–11, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/151588.pdf (highlighting
the importance that the Colombian delegation placed on antitrust immunity in the context of Open
Skies agreements); John Hughes, Japan Requires Antitrust Immunity to Complete ‘Open Skies’
Deal, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news
archive&sid=asAQYqyinmTg.
193. In international law circles, this pragmatic constraint is referred to as “International
Paretianism.” See ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE 6 (2010);
see also Brian F. Havel & Gabriel S. Sanchez, Toward a Global Aviation Emissions Agreement,
36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 351 (2012) (applying the International Paretian principle to
international aviation law).
194. See Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5, at 15–16 (summarizing aviation’s longstanding
zero-sum trade regime).
195. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.
196. See Labaton, supra note 42, at A1.
197. See supra notes 54–58, 66 and accompanying text.
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rather than attempt to micro-manage them.198 Despite this, the possibility of
congressional intervention is never fully obviated, as evidenced by a
short-lived 2009 proposal to curb alliance immunization.199 If, at some point
in the future, Congress, with strong public support, revisits this issue, then it is
critical that such deliberations not take place in splendid isolation from
institutional realities.200
There are a select number of possible reforms to the DOT’s antitrust
immunity powers that flow logically from the two main lines of
criticism—economic and legalistic—but, on the basis of the DOT’s
institutional advantages, none of them are normatively attractive. Although
some reform may be politically appropriate in the future, it is unclear what
those reforms would look like and whether trading institutional advantages for
political capital is worth it.201
A. Amplified Congressional Oversight
The first possible track of reform is for Congress to step in and scrutinize
immunity applications with greater vigor. This move may very well go
hand-in-hand with increased congressional involvement in aviation trade
policy generally. Regardless to which setting Congress turns the oversight
knob,202 it is unclear what effect further rounds of hearings and reports would
have on DOT immunity decisions. From an immunity critic’s perspective, the
best scenario is that the congressional spotlight brings the requisite public
attention necessary to furnish a mandate for more ambitious reform
measures.203 But this suggestion puts the cart before the horse because it
expects robust congressional action before a concentrated public cry for such
198. See supra notes 58–60, 62–63 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 29 (discussing Congressman Oberstar’s failed attempt to confine the
DOT’s antitrust authority).
200. See Levine, supra note 44, at 272–74, 280 (providing reasons for why it is ineffecient
for the airline industry to respond to the public interst: it is costly and time-consuming to
formulate, the interests change over time, and “public interest” in general is “not verifiable, but
only arguable”).
201. This Article offers no arguments that Congress should ignore popular support for
revising, or even terminating, the DOT’s antitrust immunization authority on the basis of abstract
principles (e.g., the “morality” of maintaining U.S. international commitments), or concrete
realities (e.g., the economic cost of losing Open Skies partners). These considerations seem
academic in nature; freighting them with the sort of supervening efficacy that would place them
over-and-above the will of the electorate may satisfy ivory tower gnostics, but always at the price
of removing a significant check on governmental power. Cf. POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE
UNBOUND, supra note 26, at 113–53 (discussing political constraints on the President and
agencies).
202. A scale that is unlikely to ever go to “11.” See THIS IS SPINAL TAP (Embassy Pictures
1984).
203. See Dean & Shane, supra note 19, at 17 (describing a Senate hearing in which questions
about whether the DOT was the appropriate agency to have the authority to grant antitrust
immunity “approach[ed] outright hostility”).
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action. There is no guarantee that hearings or reports will dislodge the public’s
general apathy toward aviation regulatory affairs, specifically alliance
immunization. Considering none of Congress’s past attempts to keep tabs on
alliance immunization yielded any groundswell for reform,204 repeating the
process is likely a waste of time and resources. Further, Congress has not been
shy about delegating broad trade policy powers to the executive branch, nor
providing its imprimatur to far-reaching trade accords with nominal oversight
and few legislative objections.205 In the aviation trade realm, Congress has had
a de minimis role to play.206 Even if a greater degree of oversight is desirable
on legalist grounds,207 its emergence in the aviation trade seems highly
unlikely.
Institutionally speaking, Congress is not well adapted to quick, decisive
action—the sort that has proven necessary in the international aviation
arena.208 For instance, the DOT hit the accelerator in 2010 on two
consolidated immunization applications featuring Japanese airlines ANA and
JAL in order to deliver an Open Skies agreement with Japan.209 Enhanced
congressional oversight would have slowed the process and perhaps
compromised the agreement with Japan.210 Moreover, U.S. aeropolitical
relations should not be taken in isolation from other international policy
concerns; the executive branch remains better situated than Congress to
calculate the role of aviation trade in the matrix of U.S. foreign relations.211 To
204. See supra note 68 (listing earlier, irregular attempts by Congress to review antitrust
immunity).
205. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. This does not mean, however, that these
agreements did not raise the hackles of interest groups such as organized labor. See James Shoch,
Contesting Globalization: Organized Labor, NAFTA, and the 1997 and 1998 Fast-Track Fights,
28 POL. & SOC’Y 119, 123–28 (2000).
206. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
207. See POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra note 26, at 7–10 (describing
and critiquing legalist objections to strong executive authority including executive agencies).
208. Cf. Daniel Abebe & Eric A. Posner, The Flaws of Foreign Affairs Legalism, 51 VA. J.
INT’L L. 507, 509–10 (2011) (explaining the judiciary’s historical deference to the executive
branch on foreign affairs matters because, compared to Congress and the judiciary, which is
“slow and decentralized,” the executive branch has “secrecy, speed[,] and decisiveness”).
209. See Horan, supra note 24, at 287–88 (criticizing the DOT for agreeing to take six
months on alliance applications which, in the past, have taken up to 19 months to conclude); see
also Final Order, U.S.-Japan Alliance Case, Docket No. DOT-OST-2010-0059 (Dep’t of Transp.
Nov. 10, 2010), 2010 DOT Av. LEXIS 483. The U.S./Japan Open Skies agreement entered into
force three days after the close of ANA and JAL’s immunization proceedings. See Air Transport
Agreement, U.S.-Japan, Oct. 25, 2010, 2010 U.S.T. LEXIS 82 (entered into force Nov. 13, 2010).
210. See POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra note 26, at 8–10.
211. See Abebe & Posner, supra note 208, at 535–38. Indeed, the EU has expressly stated
that enhanced aviation trade relations are “a key factor in promoting productive co-operation
between countries.” See A Community Aviation Policy Towards Its Neighbours, at 2, para. 2,
COM (2004) 74 final (Feb. 9, 2004). For an account of how aviation trade relations can be used
as a building block toward an incremental climate-change treaty, see Havel & Sanchez, supra
note 193.

2012]

Institutional Defense of Airline Alliance Antitrust Immunity

167

urge Congress directly into the international field risks needlessly upsetting a
foreign-relations governmental structure that, arguably, has no viable
competitors.212
B. Expanded Judicial Review
A second possible track that could meet the concerns of immunization critics
is inaugurating federal judicial review of alliance application decisions. Under
this approach, the judiciary would require the DOT to align its economic
review of antitrust applications with federal antitrust jurisprudence. Another
possibility would be for the judiciary to compel the DOT to be more mindful
of the statutory language that grants its immunization powers. Even though it
is uncertain if a court would find fault with the present body of DOT decisions,
it is unclear whether “hard look” review of immunization rulings is
desirable.213 Compared to agencies, the judiciary’s tools for generating
relevant information that bears on dynamic institutional determinations, such
as furnishing antitrust immunity to fulfill international aviation trade policy
goals, is lacking.214 Like the legislative branch, including federal courts in the
process could draw a cloud of uncertainty over each application, which may
curtail the DOT’s aviation trade policy agenda.215 Finally, considering
Congress’s telling silence on the matter of swapping Open Skies-for-Immunity
and that the legislative branch is at least better poised politically than the courts
to monitor or curtail the DOT’s immunization powers,216 judicial intervention
has scant qualities to recommend it for such a task.217
C. Interagency Power Sharing
Another route that facially overcomes the institutional limitations of
Congress and the courts would be to expand competence over alliance antitrust
212. See, e.g., Abebe & Posner, supra note 208, at 528–33, 539–44 (providing a powerful
criticisim of an alternative institutional model that would put the judiciary at the forefront of U.S.
foreign affairs).
213. This is particularly true given the courts’ willingness to defer to agency decisions and
apply weak review to the executive branch. See POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND,
supra note 26, at 84–112; cf. POSNER & VERMEULE, TERROR, supra note 26, at 15–59
(examining judicial deference to the executive branch in times of emergency). Recall, “foreign
policy considerations” can serve as a basis for green-lighting an alliance to the immunization step.
See 49 U.S.C. § 41309 (2006) (governing the “approval” step in antitrust immunity
determinations).
214. See POSNER & VERMEULE, EXECUTIVE UNBOUND, supra note 26, at 29 (“[T]he gap
between the executive and the judiciary, in information and expertise, is even wider than between
the executive and Congress.”); see also VERMEULE, UNCERTAINTY, supra note 26, at 111–12
(describing the informational defects of courts); cf. id. at 214–15 (examining the costs and
benefits of agency interpretation when compared to courts).
215. See supra notes 213–14 and accompanying text.
216. See U.S. CONST. arts. I, III (stating that the legislature is elected and federal judges are
appointed).
217. See Abebe & Posner, supra note 208, at 529–33.
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immunization to other agencies, such as the DOJ.218 The DOJ is already
vested with some antitrust authority over airline mergers and other
antitrust-related activities.219 As the main agency critic of DOT immunization
decisions, there is no doubt that the DOJ possesses the institutional incentive to
take custody of immunization proceedings and to apply its antitrust
determinations to alliance applications.220 Additionally, because of the DOJ’s
longstanding role in federal antitrust law and policy, it is better positioned
institutionally to furnish appropriate antitrust review over alliance
applications.221 This argument rests too heavily on the flawed assumption that
standard federal antitrust analysis, with its economic elements,222 is an
appropriate component of immunization proceedings or U.S. international
aviation policy. As discussed, international aviation operates within a web of
bilateral agreements that impose restrictions on foreign investment.223 U.S.
airlines in particular are restricted from accessing global capital markets and
consummating cross-border mergers that would allow creation of autonomous
global-route networks.224 If the international aviation industry was able to
“do[] business like any other business,”225 then the DOJ would be authorized to
review potential mergers to ensure their consistency with federal antitrust law.
Considering the regulated nature of the international air-transport market,
however, the DOJ’s “business-as-usual” antitrust review lacks weight.226
Tied to this low view of DOJ institutional relevance in immunity
proceedings is the stark reality that the DOJ is not an instrument of U.S.
international aviation policy like the DOT.227 Whatever virtues the DOJ
218. Any number of other agencies could be proposed, but only one is considered here in
order to ease the exposition. More importantly, each new agency that is added would only serve
to complicate immunization proceedings and inject uncertainty into the process. Because
uncertainty could harm U.S. aeropolitical relations, it should be avoided.
219. See J. Bruce McDonald, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Competition in the Air,
Remarks to the IATA Legal Symposium 2007, Istanbul, Turkey (Feb. 12, 2007), transcript
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/222159.htm (“The DOJ Antitrust
Division is responsible for enforcing the federal antitrust laws” and has “the authority to review
any particular proposed merger worldwide to determine if it may lessen competition in the U.S.
markets.”).
220. See Star Alliance Final Order, supra note 143 (acknowledging and addressing the DOJ’s
comments against the proposed immunity).
221. See POSNER, supra note 189, at 43–44 (explaining the DOJ’s role in enforcing the
Sherman Act).
222. See id. at 79–93.
223. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (explaining the “Open Skies” agreements that
the United States requires its airlines to use to create alliances).
225. See Havel & Sanchez, supra note 7, at 660. This shibboleth has been used by the global
air transport industry’s representative trade group, IATA, in its efforts to combat nationality
restrictions on airline ownership. Id.
226. See Star Alliance Final Order, supra note 143.
227. 49 U.S.C. §§ 41308–41309 (2006).
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possesses in the antitrust realm are offset by its ignorance in international
aviation affairs.228 Even where the DOT may lack relevant information
necessary to conduct international trade negotiations, the DOS—by
congressional grant—shares guardianship in the matter.229 What, possibly, can
the DOJ add to the equation? There is no evidence that the executive branch
has contemplated including the DOJ directly in antitrust immunity and external
aviation affairs.230 The Obama Administration’s behind-the-scenes resource
deployment in 2009, which halted the political knife fighting that broke out
between the DOJ and the DOT over antitrust immunity, can be seen as a
victory for the DOT.231 In the end, the DOT was not compelled to acquiesce to
DOJ demands to limit the scope of immunity that the DOT provided to the
oneworld and Star alliances.232 Perhaps room could be made for adding
international aviation trade to the DOJ’s responsibilities, but that is unlikely to
come to fruition in a world where the DOT and the DOS have already
exhibited their ability to perform external aviation functions competently.233
D. Statutory Limitations
A final track to consider is the general possibility of Congress altering the
underlying statutory authority for antitrust immunity in order to limit its scope
or duration. A proposal was advanced in 2009, but it fizzled due to
congressional inaction.234 The bill, if enacted, would have sunsetted antitrust
immunity for any alliance three years after it was issued or renewed, but left
open the possibility of a fresh grant of immunity following a new
immunization proceeding.235 This approach ignores the reality that alliance
integration agreements are complex, costly, and not easily unwound.236 The
228. See, e.g., Horan Comments to DOJ’s Star Alliance Comments, supra note 165, at 2–3,
7.
229. See 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (2006).
230. See, e.g., supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
231. See Labaton, supra note 42, at A1.
232. See oneworld Alliance Order, supra note 95; see also Star Alliance Final Order, supra
note 143.
233. Naturally, there is always room to quibble with certain aspects of DOT activity at the
international level. Such gripes lose traction, however, when they are unaccompanied by
alternative courses of action that are feasible. See, e.g., HAVEL, supra note 23, at 559–62 (calling
for international competition law enforcement for the airline industry despite the nonexistence of
such rules for any other sector).
234. See supra note 29.
235. See H.R. 831, 111th Cong. § 1(e) (2009). The legislative proposal also instructed the
U.S. Government Accountability Office to conduct a thorough review of the DOT’s
immunization grants with an eye toward evaluating, among other things, whether immunization
determinations should accord with federal antitrust law and whether the DOT’s immunity powers
should be modified. See id. § 1(b).
236. See BIRGIT KLEYMANN & HANNU SERISTÖ, MANAGING STRATEGIC AIRLINE
ALLIANCES 15, 97–98 (2004) (discussing the complexity of airline alliances and the difficulty of
changing or leaving those already in existence).
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looming threat of immunization expiration would, in all likelihood, have a
chilling effect on all but the most superficial joint ventures.237 Another
problem is that a mandatory sunset provision could fray U.S. aviation trade ties
and place U.S. Open Skies agreements in jeopardy.238 Further, the requirement
that the DOT perpetually review immunization grants wastes departmental
resources, particularly if there are no changes in the aeropolitical realm that
warrant re-examining their terms. If an Open Skies partner-State failed to
abide by the terms of a treaty, the DOT could revoke an immunization grant to
the offending State’s airlines. But, absent international fall-out, the type of
protracted review that commonly accompanies alliance applications appears
unnecessary on policy grounds.239
Regardless of what arbitrary term limit for antitrust immunity is proffered, in
the end such legislative proposals only distract from the big-picture issue of
why alliances are forged. Although the United States has used the promise of
alliances, secured through a grant of antitrust immunity, to entice States into
Open Skies agreements, the alliances themselves would lose their central
justification for existing if the airlines could replicate alliance benefits through
global investment opportunities.240
V. MOVING BEYOND ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
Under the current international aviation regime, airline alliances deliver the
worldwide network benefits and consumer perquisites of authentically
globalized airlines.241 Alliances’ commercial activities are facilitated by the
liberalized
operating
environment
created
by
Open
Skies
agreements—agreements that have helped sweep once-prominent aviation
trade elements such as capacity limits, pricing controls, and route restrictions
into the dustbin of economic history.242 But neither Open Skies nor any U.S.
237. For example, a modification that would extend the sunset provision to ten years might
be more palatable from the airlines’ and foreign governments’ perspectives, though given the fact
that such an elongated stability period would do little to change the status quo, it is difficult to
imagine congressional critics of antitrust immunity investing their time in enacting such loose
terms.
238. The absence of guaranteed, longstanding immunization for their respective airlines
might dissuade States from committing to such international legal agreements. See supra notes
194–95 and accompanying text.
239. “Commonly” does not mean “always.” In the case of Japan, the DOT “fast tracked” its
alliance review in order to secure an Open Skies agreement. See supra note 210 and
accompanying text. Presumably, the DOT could “fast track” all alliance applications that come
up for review. Doing so might run the risk of decaying the sheen of legality that protects the
DOT’s immunization decisions from further derision.
240. See Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5, at 11–15.
241. See Levine, supra note 151, at 335–38.
242. Compare BRIAN F. HAVEL, IN SEARCH OF OPEN SKIES: LAW AND POLICY FOR A NEW
ERA IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 21–23 (1997), with HAVEL, supra note 23, at 13, 318–19
(demonstrating a shift in legal/policy prescriptions from promoting Open Skies to looking toward
the next generation of even more liberal aviation trade agreements).
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free trade agreement has delivered reciprocal investment rights in airlines.243
The United States may be constrained from repealing its own inward
investment ceiling by the nationality restrictions found in most air-service
agreements.244 This excuse loses force because the United States possesses
one of the largest aviation markets in the world and has set the tempo for
global aviation policy for over sixty years.245 A realignment of U.S.
international aviation trade policy to liberal aviation agreements, which would
swap antitrust immunity for investment rights, would send a strong signal to
the international community that the days of immunized alliances are waning
and that a novus ordo for global air services is on the horizon.246 Even though
immunized alliances may be necessary in the interval between the advent of a
new trade regime and the realization of a globalized aviation marketplace,
alliances’ imminent extinction should be enough to quell the complaints of
stakeholders and academics surveyed in this Article.247
All of this is exponentially easier said than done. That some of the DOT’s
most vocal critics rabidly resist the idea of relaxing U.S. foreign investment
restrictions in airlines is no small irony. The same Congressman who proposed
sunsetting alliance antitrust immunity in 2009 also championed several
legislative initiatives to strengthen the U.S.’s citizen-purity test for airline
ownership.248 Organized labor has also opposed foreign ownership, mainly on
protectionist grounds.249 Further, issues of national security are implicated,
though the United States has administrative measures in place to review and
block unsavory investments.250 These factors, coupled with the public’s
243. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1201(2)(b), Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (excluding air services from coverage); see also, e.g., Free Trade
Agreement, U.S.-Austl., art. 10.1(4)(c), May 18, 2004, 118 Stat. 919 (limiting coverage to
“aircraft repair and maintenance services during which an aircraft is withdrawn from service” and
“specialty air services,” e.g., aerial mapping, surveying photography, advertising, etc.).
244. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 40102(a)(15), 41101(a)(1), 41102(a) (2006) (requiring that the DOT
only issue transportation certifications of airlines to U.S. citizens and defining U.S. citizen to
include corporations with less than twenty-five percent foreign ownership).
245. The U.S. convened the International Civil Aviation Conference on Nov. 1, 1944, which
led to the Chicago Convention. See Havel & Sanchez, supra note 5, at 4.
246. See id. at 3–4; see also Havel & Sanchez, supra note 7, at 669–70.
247. See, e.g., EMIRATES, supra note 158, at 2; HAVEL, supra note 23; Bilotkach &
Hüschelrath, supra note 87, at 76–78; Horan, supra note 24, at 253–62, 283–86; Reitzes & Moss,
supra note 107, at 326–27.
248. See FAA Reauthorization Act of 2007, H.R. 2881, 110th Cong. § 801 (2007) (not
enacted); see also FAA Reauthorization Act of 2009, H.R. 915, 111st Cong. § 801 (2009) (not
enacted). The provision, introduced by former Congressman Oberstar, would have required
“citizens of the United States [to] control all matters pertaining to the business and structure of [a
U.S.] air carrier, including operational matters such as marketing, branding, fleet composition,
route selection, pricing, and labor relations.” H.R. 915 § 801; H.R. 2881 § 801. Under current
federal law, “actual control” is undefined. See 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(15)(C) (2006).
249. See Havel & Sanchez, supra note 7, at 669 n.133.
250. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-320, FOREIGN
INVESTMENT: LAWS AND POLICIES OF REGULATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN 10 COUNTRIES.
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indifference toward aviation trade and regulatory issues, militate against the
immediate possibility of substantial reform to U.S. investment rules in
particular and the global air-services-trade regime as a whole.251 The DOT is
capable of relaxing its review of foreign capital infusions in U.S. airlines,252
but too brazen a defiance of a federal statute could incite a congressional
versus executive battle that could do more harm than good.253 The DOT, at the
very least, would be unable to deliver a firm commitment to U.S. aviation
powers concerning investment rights until the legislative branch acts.254
Meanwhile, the apparent need for the alliances and Open Skies-for-Immunity
remains a fixed reality in U.S. international aviation trade policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Antitrust immunity undoubtedly rings strange to ears tuned to the triumphant
hymn of deregulation that once resounded in Washington, think tanks,255 and
academia,256 but it retains considerable purchase in the restricted confines of
the international aviation market. Revising, if not altogether eliminating, the
DOT’s power to award antitrust immunity has been suggested by various
camps, including industry stakeholders and academics, but their arguments
have failed to take proper account of institutional variables thus far.257
Specifically, they have erred in not fully appreciating the institutional
advantages the DOT, as an executive agency, possesses with respect to

The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 allows a cross-departmental
consortium of federal agencies labeled the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS) to investigate any foreign acquisition of a U.S. carrier and impose conditions mitigating
any potential security risks. Pub. L. No. 110-49, § 2(b)(2), 121 Stat. 246, 248–49 (2007)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 2170 (Supp. IV 2011)); see also Joseph Mamounas,
Controlling Foreign Ownership of U.S. Strategic Assets: The Challenge of Maintaining National
Security in a Globalized and Oil Dependent World, 13 L. & BUS. REV. AMS. 381, 395–96 (2007)
(discussing the potential application of FINSA to the airline industry).
251. See Levine, supra note 44, at 273–74.
252. This could potentially occur when political tempers are not aflame with xenophobia.
See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
253. For instance, Congress may, without considering the full array of consequences, take
budgetary or statutory action against the DOT in order to reassert its legislative dominance,
though perhaps only if there is significant public support for it to do so. To the extent that the
DOT possesses what Michael Levine refers to as “slack”—political indifference that “shields
regulators from scrutiny or influence,”—the DOT may have enough latitude to circumvent the
statutory language, at least for a time. See Levine, supra note 44, at 273.
254. See id.
255. See, e.g., About, AM. ENTERPRISE INST., http://www.aei.org/about (last visited Sept. 15,
2012).
256. See, e.g., JOHN VAN OVERTVELDT, THE CHICAGO SCHOOL: HOW THE UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO ASSEMBLED THE THINKERS WHO REVOLUTIONIZED ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS
197–238, 287–322 (2007) (covering free market principles and supporting “limited
government”).
257. See supra notes 171–75 and accompanying text.
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developing and executing international aviation trade policy.258 As such, their
critiques place too much emphasis on the DOT meeting some higher-level
concept of legality or economic efficiency and too little on the hard truth that
the alternative frameworks flowing from their critiques are institutionally
precarious and thus normatively unattractive.259 Perhaps, at some point down
the road, more thoughtful reflection will be given to how immunization grants
can be arranged to meet one or more higher-level concepts while still
successfully maintaining U.S. policy agendas such as Open Skies. Until then
or, better yet, until the United States works to move aviation’s trade regime out
of the dark ages, the DOT’s antitrust immunization authority should be left
alone.

258. Supra notes 171–75 and accompanying text.
259. Compare supra Part III.A–B, with supra Part III.C–D.
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